Throughout its history, and particularly in the modern age, medicine has fought to conquer disease and to "tame" death. There have been remarkable successes. Yet clearly there are limits to the reach of medicine that are influenced by context and time. In other words, there are points beyond which medicine should not go-either because it will not be effective in achieving its goals (however these are defined) or because it will cause more harm than benefit. While there is general agreement that medicine is, and should be, limited-there is little consensus on how this point can be defined, who has the authority to define it, what the implications are of such judgements, and what processes should be enacted both to guide decision-making and to resolve contest around the ends and goals of medicine.
Three decades of debate on medical futility have provided little clarity and have produced a plethora of definitions, procedures, and conceptual models, with futility being both hailed as the way to preserve medical professionalism (Schneiderman and Jecker 1993) and rejected as largely unworkable in clinical practice (Halevy and Brody 1996) . A review of this literature illustrates how futility is conceptually and practically challenging. It attempts to reconcile evidence and ethics, medical professionalism, and patient-centred care while acknowledging increasing patient expectations and the growth of technologies that extend the transition between life and death. While some were ready to declare the fall of the "futility movement" in the late 1990s (Helft et al. 2000) , debates around futility continue, unlikely to be resolved. We suggest this is not a source of regret but an opportunity to enrich and encourage us through debate and reflection on the values that underpin just and humane health care (Truog 2010) . Indeed, to seek closure of such discourse is to misunderstand what ethics is and how it can contribute meaningfully to biomedicine and health care.
This symposium revives the debate around futility and continues exploration of its meaning, method, and application in different contexts and in different populations. The work of Larry Schneiderman and Nancy Jecker has played an important role in increasing the sophistication of thinking around this concept, and each contributes a paper to this symposium. Schneiderman's piece offers a useful starting point as it provides a historical overview of the futility debate, including an account of the foundations of futility and the various efforts to define it in qualitative and quantitative terms. The paper concludes with a signpost for the future-away from a construction of futility disengaged from clinical medicine to an ethic of care. Jecker, likewise, examines the moral difficulties, and sensitivities, surrounding the assessment of best interests and the determination of futility in the care of children. Her paper is important because it shows how context and narrative may impact on the assessment of futility, and it reminds us also of the need for carefully reasoned ethical analysis.
Eleanor Milligan takes a different view of futility -taking aim at the power imbalances that characterise unilateral declarations of futility and the decisions to withdraw treatment that often follow such assessments. She notes that futile treatment is often declared, defined, and defended by clinicians using "objective" medical knowledge and procedural models reinforced by biological and epidemiological data, a process that makes patients mute, suspended somewhere between life and death by the assessments of their treating physician. This, she suggests, is morally disingenuous, as it is more a representation of power than of any moral concern for the values and needs of the patient. What is required, therefore, is a more rigorous critique of the conditions, context, and implications of such judgements. Grant Gillett takes up Milligan's challenge, noting, as she does, that the concept of futility often rolls together medical and value judgements and may serve to marginalise the real interests of a patient. Through consideration of the clinical decisions that may need to be made regarding the care of a patient in a minimally conscious state, Gillett argues that futility provides little conceptual or clinical guidance and that ethical judgements are more profitably directed by consideration of three related concepts: physiological futility, substantial benefit, and the risk of unacceptable badness. Ashby, likewise, recoils against the language of futility. In accordance with Gillett and Milligan, he does not reject the idea that there are times where medicine may not be able to achieve its goals, however defined; rather, he argues, the concept of futility has not served to inform the ethical analysis of end-of-life care but to derail more important discussions about mortality, meaning, and care at the end of life.
Perhaps appropriately, this symposium concludes with a paper by Cameron Stewart that completely rejects the notion that futility is, or should be, a medical concept determined solely by the medical profession. Stewart argues that medical definitions of futility are ultimately claims of sovereignty and there are a number of reasons why such claims must fail. He suggests that judgements of futility are about a contest over values, interests, and goals and thus can only be made procedurally. His paper and this symposium conclude with an overview of the strengths and limitations of such procedural approaches to futility.
